There’s a lot of punditry left to be committed about whether and how the GOP majority in the House and the enhanced GOP minority in the Senate will work with the Obama Administration. I’m not optimistic. But even if the President and House Republicans are able to find some small patch of common ground, the hard reality that progressives need to swallow is that whatever major progressive legislation will bear Barack Obama’s signature has already become law, at least for his first term.
The same is not true, however, for what Barack Obama might accomplish simply by infusing the health and safety agencies in his Administration—from EPA to OSHA to FDA—with a sense of urgency, clearing away barriers to regulatory progress within his own White House, and insisting that the agencies enforce existing laws with newfound vigor. A string of catastrophes have shown that we need proactive government at least as much in these areas as we need cops on the beat in neighborhoods and airport security, even as Americans claim to hate government in a larger sense.
Resurrection of these agencies was a low priority for the President during his first two years. He made great appointments, but then left the agencies to cope with budget shortfalls and inadequate legal authority. As just one especially shocking example, FDA cannot order a recall of salmonella-poisoned food but instead must depend on the producer’s cooperation to get the food off the shelves. Worst of all, Cass Sunstein, his appointee to the post of “regulatory czar,” where he essentially supervises the agencies from the White House, has in many ways continued the Bush II pattern of red tape and neglect. “Yes we can” became “No we won’t” in too many instances. His small office continues to serve as a lobby for any powerful business interest—from coal companies to chemical manufacturers—intent on consigning the cops to desk duty.
Republicans followed the pattern of the Bush II Administration, screaming about overregulation and even going so far as to protest the rough treatment of British Petroleum in the Gulf. As usual, they gained traction by ranting against government writ large, not by acknowledging the need—no, the expectation and rock-solid demand—that these first-line responders keep Americans safe.
The predictable result was a mixed record--some regulators seized the opportunity and moved briskly ahead. Others bogged down.
All of that is squarely within the President’s power to fix. But will he?
Full textCross posted from The Pump Handle.
MSHA announced Tuesday that it will be issuing on September 23 an emergency temporary standard (ETS) to improve a practice to prevent coal dust explosions. The rule addresses "rock dusting"--the decades old practice of generously applying pulverized limestone dust throughout a coal mine to dilute the potential power of a coal dust explosion. As NIOSH's Man and Teacoach explain:
"...the rock dust disperses, mixes with the coal dust and prevents flame propagation by acting as a thermal inhibitor or heat sink; i.e., the rock dust reduces the flame temperature to the point where devolatilization of the coal particles can no longer occur; thus, the explosion is inhibited."
Investigators suspect that the deadly blast that killed 29 miners on April 5 at Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch mine may have been fueled by coal dust.
When the Labor Secretary Hilda Solis issued the Department's regulatory agenda in May 2010, a revision to MSHA's rock dust standard was not identified as a rulemaking priority. The agency's standard, which dates back to 1969, drew the attention however of Congressman George Miller (D-CA). He included revisions to the rock dust standard in H.R. 5663, a worker safety bill he introduced on July 1, 2010. I suspect the Congressman had read Coal Tattoo's April 13 post reporting that government scientists had warned that existing rock dust standards were inadequate for Tuesday's highly mechanized underground coal mining practices.
Full textJust before the July 4 recess, Representative George Miller, Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, introduced the Miner Safety and Health Act of 2010. Recent explosions at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch Mine, Tesoro’s Anacortes (WA) refinery, BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling platform, and U.S. Steel’s coke oven in Clairton (PA), highlight the life-threatening hazards that American workers face on a daily basis. Despite these hazards—and the myriad other less serious or even chronic hazards that don’t make headlines—workers continue to do their jobs day in and day out.
Contrast these workers’ diligence with that of certain members of Congress, who, in advance of today’s committee vote on the Miner Safety and Health Act, have said that they want to hold off on legislating until they see the official reports on the causes of the Upper Big Branch explosion. Sure, official reports on that explosion will reveal important details about exactly what caused that particular disaster, notable for its severity and harrowing death toll. But as MSHA proved with its five-day “inspection blitz” of 57 underground coal mines in April, miners continue to work in conditions that we know are hazardous. The problem isn’t that we don’t understand the hazards that lead to explosions or other dangerous conditions, it’s that companies are choosing not to comply with the standards that would protect their workers. In just three days, MSHA issued more than 1,500 citations for violations of federal mine health and safety standards. MSHA had to order a halt to operations at six mines in Kentucky because of rampant violations. Clearly, economics—not workers’ safety—is the driving force for these companies’ decisions about compliance with federal law.
The Miner Safety and Health Act is designed to alter the current economics of noncompliance, where the penalties for violating worker safety protections are too often seen as just the cost of doing business. Among other things, the law would increase penalties, force mining companies to fix workplace hazards while they contest citations, and give whistleblowers a right to sue employers on their own behalf when the government’s whistleblower protection agency works too slowly. The bill is a systemic response to systemic problems. Waiting for official reports about the specific causes of one disaster will only shift the debate toward piecemeal reforms that will leave millions working in the same dangerous conditions without the full array of new protections afforded by the bill as introduced.
Full textToday, the Senate appropriations subcommittee chaired by Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) will discuss "Investing in Mine Safety: Preventing Another Disaster" and hear testimony from the notorious Don Blankenship, chief executive officer of Massey Energy, owner of the Upper Big Branch disaster where 29 miners lost their lives on April 5.
Workers safety and health advocates have posted calls over the past months to “send Blankenship to jail,” perhaps under federal racketeering laws, and the FBI opened an inquiry into potential criminal charges against company officials who may have bribed federal inspectors to keep the mines running despite these repeated violations. The relevant law is in fact remarkably straightforward, and even the evidence amassed in press accounts, by definition much less than the FBI could and should uncover, provides ample support for a strong case against Don Blankenship under the Mine Safety Act itself, which incorporates the “responsible corporate officer” doctrine crafted decades ago by the Supreme Court.
Under the doctrine, a corporate executive who knew or should have known that bad actions are happening, and who is a position to stop those activities, is potentially liable criminally under “public welfare” statutes like the Mine Safety Act, the hazardous waste laws, and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Press accounts indicate that not only did Blankenship know that his mines were catastrophically unsafe, but actually did the opposite of correcting those conditions: he created such pressure to produce coal that workers were afraid they would be fired if took the time to correct blatant safety hazards.
Full textCross-posted from The Pump Handle.
Last month, the US Dept of Labor (DOL) and MSHA were celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. Their proclamations said:
“…this law represents a watershed moment in the improvement of occupational health and safety in the United States. It was the precursor to the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, which created MSHA, and it was the basis of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) of 1970. The Coal Act forever transformed occupational safety and health in the United States.”
Now, I’m reading news story after news story with these same officials asserting the Mine Act is weak and doesn’t provide MSHA the tools it needs to shut down dangerous workplaces. The spin machine is kicking into high gear.
The Charleston Gazette’s Ken Ward Jr. reports that federal inspectors issued closure orders at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch Mine more than 60 times in 2009 and 2010. The mine was repeatedly cited for allowing potentially explosive coal dust to accumulate and for flagrant violations of its very own ventilation plan. (When a mine operator deviates even slightly from its approved plan for ensuring proper airflow in an underground mine, the consequences can be devastating. Sadly, very sadly, that’s likely a contributing factor in Monday’s explosion that killed 25 coal miners and possibly the four workers who have not yet been found.)
Full textAbout a year ago in this space, I wrote a piece taking the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to task for its unhinged reaction to the Environmental Protection Agency’s then-nascent efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. As an example of the bombast, I included a link to a speech made by Chamber board member Don Blankenship, head of Massey Energy, in which he denied climate change, compared those who disagree with him with Osama Bin Laden and called them communists and atheists, accused environmentalists of “taking over the world,” and much more.
Apparently, such outrageous rhetoric doesn’t disqualify someone from being on the board of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. You know what else doesn’t disqualify a coal industry honcho ? Operating a dangerous mine. It was in a Massey mine that 25 coal miners died earlier this week, after a methane explosion – the same mine, ThinkProgress notes, that had been cited for more than 3,000 safety violations in the last 15 years. Fifty-three of those violations were issued this past March.
The anti-regulatory crowd is fond of asserting that, left to their own devices, markets are self-correcting, and that abuses will be punished in the marketplace. The long history of mining deaths in the United States – more than 1,000/year through the first half of the 20th Century, then gradually down to about 30 a year between 2000 and 2005, according to the Mine Safety and Health Administration, and not counting black lung disease – argues otherwise, of course. But the argument persists. Perhaps the Massey disaster will test the theory.
It’s too soon to know what caused this week’s disaster – whether it was the product of Massey negligence or something else. But one thing we know for sure is that Massey’s safety record is, as the AP put it, “spotty.” And to think, until this week, Don Blankenship was best known for his political extremism.
Full textTwenty-five people have been killed in the coal mine disaster in West Virginia.
At ABC News, Matthew Mosk and Asa Eslocker report on the safety history of the Upper Big Branch mine:
The West Virginia coal mine where an explosion killed 25 workers and left another four unaccounted for in the worst mining disaster since 1984 had amassed scores of citations from mining safety officials, including 57 infractions just last month for violations that included repeatedly failing to develop and follow a ventilation plan.
The Charleston Gazette's Ken Ward Jr. runs down what to look for in the coming days and says the disaster could prove a "test of whether the MINER Act reforms went far enough." The Washington Post's Ed O'Keefe notes a report from a few days ago by the Labor Department's Office of the Inspector General on inadequate training for mine safety inspectors. AP has a list of fatal mine disasters in the United States in the past decades.
Full textCenter for Progressive Reform policy analyst Matthew Shudtz blogs on mountaintop removal mining. In one week in December, the Bank of America announced that it would stop funding companies that use the destructive technique, while at the same time the Environmental Protection Agency announced support of a rule change by the Office of Surface Mining to eliminate stream buffer protections. Full text