Lizzie Grossman has a nice post over at The Pump Handle highlighting how the National Contingency Plan for major oil spills has significant gaps, which left government agencies and cleanup workers in the Gulf scrambling to figure out the right training programs and the best ways to protect workers' health and safety in the days, weeks, and months following the BP spill.
But, as Lizzie points out, one of the most powerful advocates for fixing the NCP -- the National Spill Commission -- has left the issue of cleanup workers' by the wayside:
Occupational health issues for responders are simply not [the] focus of the Commission's review: OSHA is only mentioned twice in the body of the report. The role of the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) in the response is not described at all, nor is the health impacts roster maintained by the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. The body of the report mentions neither the National Institutes of Health nor the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.
Tens of thousands of people participated in cleanup efforts last summer. Despite the sweltering heat and some areas overrun with heavy equipment, no workers died and injury and illness rates were relatively low. Long-term health impacts of cleanup work will be more difficult to measure. But OSHA, NIEHS, and NIOSH deserve recognition for their work.
Full textEvery year, OSHA mails a letter to about 15,000 employers who run high-hazard worksites, warning them that their most recent annual injury and illness rates were well above average. According to OSHA,
For every 100 full-time workers, the 15,000 employers had 4.5 or more injuries or illnesses which resulted in days away from work, restricted work or job transfer. The national average is 2.0.
The letters went out in March, but I just got around to digging into the list of recipients (zip file), and thought I’d share some analysis that I haven’t seen anywhere else. Sorting the list by industry code, I put together a chart of the industries that received the most total letters -- down through the top 10 percent of them. The chart gives some additional detail (like the percent of surveyed employers who received letters in each industry), but here’s the rub:
Today, OSHA released a “proposed interpretation” of its 39-year old noise exposure standards. Talk about making up for lost time. All joking aside, this move truly is a positive step for American workers, and may demonstrate a path of action that could help OSHA address hazards in addition to excessive noise.
Over the years, the federal courts and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) have muddied the waters of many OSHA regulations, enforcement policies, and rulemaking procedures. Their sometimes contradictory, sometimes ambiguous decisions have left OSHA struggling to write new standards in a cumbersome rulemaking process and unable to stringently enforce existing standards—or even employers’ fundamental obligations under the General Duty Clause. The story of the noise exposure standards, as told in today’s Federal Register notice, is a prime example.
OSHA first promulgated the noise exposure standards in 1971, under its authority to adopt already-established federal health and safety standards. These rules OSHA adopted required employers to use "feasible" administrative or engineering controls if their employees were exposed to sound exceeding specified levels. (Administrative controls might be rotating shifts at high-noise tasks; engineering controls might involve isolating machinery or workers.) If those controls failed to reduce the sound below the specified levels, employers were to provide employees with earmuffs, earplugs, or other personal protective equipment. In 1975, OSHA issued interpretive guidance explaining that the rules meant exactly what they said: employers must use administrative and engineering controls to reduce noise hazards, and PPE must be used as a supplement if the other controls were insufficient.
Full textIn Tuesday's New York Times story, “In a Feast of Data on BPA Plastic, No Final Answer,” Denise Grady characterizes the continued development of new studies about the endocrine disrupting chemical as yet another dispute between environmentalists and chemical manufacturers over a ubiquitous chemical with uncertain health effects. While her assessment of the state of the science is accurate, she expends thousands of words parsing the uncertainty and profiling the scientists who’ve made it their work to reduce the uncertainty without fully exploring the bigger picture context that would explain why this isn’t a petty dispute.
The question Grady left unanswered was, Why is there so much uncertainty about the health effects of a chemical that is produced in quantities of nearly a million tons per year? Two reasons immediately come to mind.
First, chemical manufacturers operate under a system of antiquated laws. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), allows a company to put a new chemical into commerce without having to make any explicit determination about its safety. Instead, the company simply informs EPA that it is going to manufacture the chemical, turns over whatever health and safety data it might happen to have on hand (they’re not required by law or regulation to actually do any testing), and then just waits 90 days. In the meantime, EPA may only put limits on production or use of the chemical if it is able to make a determination (in that time) that the chemical presents an unreasonable risk. Of course, without any test data that would be relevant to that determination, EPA is not likely to regulate.
Full textOn Wednesday, EPA announced its intention to revise (pdf) the TSCA Inventory Update Rule (IUR). The TSCA Inventory is the official list of chemicals in commerce, and the IUR is the regulation that requires companies to submit production and use data to EPA to ensure the Inventory accurately represents all of the chemicals out there. This week's announcement marks the second time in ten years that EPA has decided the IUR needs improvement, based on agency staff’s efforts to regulate toxic chemicals using the data available to them.
As Dan Rosenberg points out over at Switchboard, the changes are mostly good, although EPA certainly could have gone further on a few fronts. For one, EPA has expressed some interest in changing the IUR’s requirements for reporting occupational exposures—changes that would be a huge improvement—but hasn’t yet decided exactly how to implement the changes.
Under current regulations, we don’t get much information about occupational exposures to toxic chemicals. In addition to total production volume data, companies have to describe the total number of workers likely to be exposed to a chemical (provided in a range), the maximum concentration of a chemical when it’s sent off site (or when it’s reacted on-site), and the physical form of the chemical. For chemicals produced or imported in quantities greater than 300,000 pounds per year, existing regulations mandate disclosure of some additional information about processing and use, but not enough to significantly improve our understanding of worker exposures. That’s in fact rather basic data, and leaves out the details that would allow for better risk management, including information on specific worker tasks and potential exposures. According to EPA, the information submitted under these regulations was so useless that the agency “could develop only qualitative exposure characterizations with relative ranking of low, medium, or high for characterizing potential exposures to various populations.”
Full textJust before the July 4 recess, Representative George Miller, Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, introduced the Miner Safety and Health Act of 2010. Recent explosions at Massey Energy’s Upper Big Branch Mine, Tesoro’s Anacortes (WA) refinery, BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling platform, and U.S. Steel’s coke oven in Clairton (PA), highlight the life-threatening hazards that American workers face on a daily basis. Despite these hazards—and the myriad other less serious or even chronic hazards that don’t make headlines—workers continue to do their jobs day in and day out.
Contrast these workers’ diligence with that of certain members of Congress, who, in advance of today’s committee vote on the Miner Safety and Health Act, have said that they want to hold off on legislating until they see the official reports on the causes of the Upper Big Branch explosion. Sure, official reports on that explosion will reveal important details about exactly what caused that particular disaster, notable for its severity and harrowing death toll. But as MSHA proved with its five-day “inspection blitz” of 57 underground coal mines in April, miners continue to work in conditions that we know are hazardous. The problem isn’t that we don’t understand the hazards that lead to explosions or other dangerous conditions, it’s that companies are choosing not to comply with the standards that would protect their workers. In just three days, MSHA issued more than 1,500 citations for violations of federal mine health and safety standards. MSHA had to order a halt to operations at six mines in Kentucky because of rampant violations. Clearly, economics—not workers’ safety—is the driving force for these companies’ decisions about compliance with federal law.
The Miner Safety and Health Act is designed to alter the current economics of noncompliance, where the penalties for violating worker safety protections are too often seen as just the cost of doing business. Among other things, the law would increase penalties, force mining companies to fix workplace hazards while they contest citations, and give whistleblowers a right to sue employers on their own behalf when the government’s whistleblower protection agency works too slowly. The bill is a systemic response to systemic problems. Waiting for official reports about the specific causes of one disaster will only shift the debate toward piecemeal reforms that will leave millions working in the same dangerous conditions without the full array of new protections afforded by the bill as introduced.
Full textWith the strong support of their new Administrator, last year the EPA staff who administer TSCA came up with a novel idea for jump-starting a moribund regulatory program. They started publishing Chemical Action Plans (CAPs) for a selection of chemicals “that pose a concern to the public.” Having selected chemicals that are found in consumer products, produced in large volumes, have particular concerns for children’s health, or meet other criteria, EPA staff published action plans for the chemicals that provide a clear and concise profile of each chemicals’ hazards, exposures, and risks and lay out regulatory actions EPA might take in the near future. The documents are truly excellent pieces of work in that they provide a summary of complex and controversial science within the context of the agency’s duties and powers under existing law, and they do so without getting bogged down in scientific or legal minutae.
But now activists with the American Chemistry Council (ACC) have resurrected the wasteful practice of filing Requests for Correction under the Data Quality Act, this time (pdf) in response to EPA’s action plan for phthalates (pdf), proving once again that ACC will harass EPA for taking even the smallest steps.
The RfC alleges that the action plan contains “numerous factual errors” and that it therefore “fails to meet the requisite standard for objectivity.” A majority of their complaints focus on elements of EPA’s summary of potential hazards and routes of exposure, generally faulting EPA for not including references to studies that may provide evidence that would lessen the agency’s concerns. The general perspective underscores the real point of debate that ACC has manufactured with its RfC: What degree of precision is appropriate for EPA’s action plans?
Full textEPA today announced (pdf) that it will begin a general practice of reviewing – and likely rejecting – confidentiality claims regarding chemical identities and supporting data in health and safety studies submitted to the agency under TSCA. The news is long overdue, but very welcome.
One of Congress’s primary goals in drafting TSCA was to create regulatory mechanisms through which EPA would gather information about the human health and environmental effects of toxic chemicals. Recognizing the societal benefits of broad disclosure of that information, Congress created an exemption for “health and safety studies” from TSCA § 14’s general prohibition on EPA’s disclosure of information submitted to the agency and claimed to be trade secrets or confidential business information (CBI). Health and safety information, in other words, was too important to be hidden from the public.
But despite the plain language of the statute, EPA for years simply turned a blind eye when health and safety studies were submitted under the Act’s information disclosure requirements and stamped as CBI. In fact, EPA even developed a process through which companies could claim that elements of a health and safety study – including chemical identities and supporting data – pass as CBI.
Full textIn the year since EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced a new process (pdf) for updating chemical risk assessments in EPA's IRIS database, agency scientists have succeeded in getting some stalled assessments moving through the system. Since the May 21, 2009 announcement, EPA staff have competed nine new and updated assessments. Two others are in the final stages of review and 20 more are at the external peer review stage.
But just as EPA staff are getting geared up, industry, potentially regulated federal agencies, and the White House are trying to throw a monkey wrench into the works.
First, Inside EPA reports (subs. required, "Industry, Agencies Struggle To Revise EPA's Risk Assessment Process") that anti-regulatory advocate Jim Tozzi's Center for Regulatory Effectiveness is making the claim that external peer review must be "Data Quality Act compliant." That's a great way to strike fear in the minds of an embattled office like the IRIS office, but it lacks any real basis. The purpose of a Science Advisory Board SAB (SAB) review is to get outside scientists' opinion on specific science-policy decisions made by EPA staff in the process of developing the IRIS assessment. By definition, opinions are not "information" covered by EPA’s DQA guidelines (pdf, p.16), so the DQA doesn't apply. And even if it did apply, there's no checklist to make sure a document is DQA compliant. The DQA simply creates a (not-judicially-reviewable) administrative mechanism for outside parties to request that an agency correct information that they disseminate that does not meet the agency's DQA guidelines. At its core, the DQA respects the fact that agencies are staffed by dedicated and highly competent individuals who do high quality work. The burden is on an outside party to prove that disseminated information does not conform to an agency's DQA guidelines. There is no burden for EPA to perform any sort of DQA-specific analysis of a piece of information before disseminating it.
Full textVirginia AG Ken Cuccinelli II has taken his climate change vendetta to a new low, announcing that he will use Virginia's Fraud Against Taxpayers Act to force officials at UVA to spend months digging through a decade of university records in search of evidence that Dr. Michael Mann "defrauded" the Commonwealth by seeking funds to explore the boundaries of climate science.
Tuesday's article in the Washington Post gave the attention-seeking politician all that he needed from the civil investigative demand issued to Dr. Mann's former employer. Now Cuccinelli will move on to his next headline-grabbing venture without a care for the disruptions he's left in his wake.
As others have pointed out, threatening academics with legal penalties sets a terrible precedent that will stifle the innovation and progress that are the hallmarks of the United States' great research universities. It was bad enough when Rep. Joe Barton first started harassing Dr. Mann over his work, signaling to all climate scientists that they'd better be careful what they researched or the full force of a congressional investigation might be in their future. Now that Cuccinelli has set the precedent of making onerous demands on the universities that employ researchers who work on the cutting edge, there will be another dimension to the pressures that will constrain American academics.
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